Energy Musings - June 1, 2026
BP ousted its chairman over bullying and conduct issues. The media covered the back-and-forth over the claims. This continues BP's decades-long management turmoil, but it is a board problem.
Ripping The Management Bandage Off At BP
Is the latest management change at BP plc a signal of the start of a new era or an extension of the decades of poor management and governance? Last week, financial markets were shocked when BP announced that its chairman, Albert Manifold, would be removed immediately. The latest BP shakeup leaves one wondering whether this is merely the next chapter in the decades-long mismanagement crisis or an opportunity for a more dramatic remaking of this iconic company.
BP’s former chairman, Albert Manifold.
The company’s bare-bones press release stated everything in the first paragraph.
“The Board of BP p.l.c. (LSE and NYSE: bp) (“bp”) announces that it has today unanimously decided that Albert Manifold should no longer serve as Chair and Director with immediate effect. This follows serious concerns raised to the Board related to important governance standards, oversight and conduct.”
It then provided appropriate statements from key directors. Amanda Blanc, Senior Independent Director, commented on the board’s surprise and disappointment about Manifold’s governance oversight and conduct issues. Then there were comments from Ian Tyler, who was installed as Interim Chair, about the Board and company leadership’s “deep conviction in the strategic direction we have laid out.” He also commented on BP’s recent performance and its focus on financial discipline to grow shareholder value. Of course, Manifold was key to developing the new strategic direction and to hiring Meg O’Neil as BP’s new CEO to implement it.
To ensure that financial markets understood that this action was not a repudiation of the current management team, the Board included a paragraph outlining its view of the new CEO and her progress to date.
“The Board has been very impressed with Meg O’Neill since she joined as CEO. She has extensive industry and operational experience and real clarity about the direction and opportunity for the business. She has already taken bold action to simplify and strengthen the organization such as announcing the move to a clearly defined upstream/downstream model. Under her leadership we are building a simpler, stronger, more valuable bp.”
The press release concluded that the search for a new Chair would begin immediately.
A Financial Times article about the management change included a chart of BP’s share price performance since 2021, noting the points at which management changed. Since 2023, BP has seen two CEOs and two Chairs leave the company. The rejection of the green-energy focus has helped the share performance, as has the improving outlook for oil stocks, and BP’s possible sale prospects.
BP’s checkered stock price performance and management turmoil.
These management changes are an extension of a long period of management upheaval, marked by disastrous operating results that almost sank the company.
Understanding what happened and why requires recognizing the longer-term management crisis as a reflection of BP’s corporate culture. It started in 2007, when Lord John Browne stepped down following revelations that he had lied to a U.K. court over his relationship with his partner. This came two years after the company saw its Texas City refinery in the U.S. explode, killing 15 workers and injuring 180. Over $200 million in damage ($330 million today) was done to the plant. Including the settlements ($2.1 billion), cost of repairs, deferred production, and fines, this was the world’s costliest refinery accident.
In 2010, Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon floating drilling rig exploded while drilling a 5,000-foot, high-pressure oil well in the Gulf of Mexico. The blowout and fire killed 11 workers, injured 17, and created the worst oil spill in industry history. Later, WikiLeaks released documents reporting a similar incident on a BP-owned rig in the Caspian Sea in the fall of 2008.
The Deepwater Horizon disaster took five months to seal the well, with cleanup of the spilled oil lasting until June 2013 in areas off Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi, and until April 2014 off Louisiana. In response to U.S. government pressure, BP created a $20 billion compensation fund, which was largely depleted by 2013. But BP’s total costs exceeded $40 billion, and the company lost almost a quarter of its market value during the disaster and its aftermath.
BP’s record of operational performance was completely discredited. Such a record limits other industry players’ willingness to partner on projects. At the same time, BP’s poor financial position limited its ability to finance new major projects, even with partners. BP was set way back, and forced to focus on the assets it already had.
Oil industry accidents do happen; however, the string of disasters was telling. But the most significant fallout from the Deepwater Horizon disaster was the public relations missteps by BP’s chief executive, Tony Hayward. He became the face of the disaster because he was frequently on TV. However, when he left to sail in a U.K. race during the height of the cleanup efforts, he drew sharp criticism from the public, regulators, politicians, governance experts, and public relations advisors. He also famously said, “I’d like my life back,” while families were burying their deceased members. He was also flippant and obfuscating in responses during media interviews and when testifying before the U.S. Congress. Hayward was replaced in October 2010 by American Bob Dudley, who had been running BP’s joint Russian operations.
The Deepwater Horizon rig was on fire after the well blowout and explosion.
BP believed that placing Dudley in charge would improve its image in America. His job was to determine how to downsize the company to bolster its financial position and improve operational performance. Dudley did the job in a low-key manner, which helped BP’s image by keeping the company out of the news for a decade.
When it was time for BP to appoint a new CEO, the Board and Chairman Helge Lund decided it was important for BP to return to its green energy strategy, developed by Lord Browne after he engineered the acquisition of Amoco. BP was responding to the growing climate change activism in Europe. Beyond Petroleum became BP’s tagline during Lord Browne’s tenure, and its logo was changed to a multi-shaded starburst. The new green effort did not revive the tagline, although many market observers did.
Bernard Looney was elevated to BP’s CEO in 2020 and immediately signaled a strategic shift toward green energy and a scaling back of its oil and gas business. Such a change was upsetting to long-time shareholders and the company’s retirees, who were dependent on dividend growth for their income. Looney’s tenure saw many oil and gas executives leave, and the focus on green energy hurt BP’s share performance, despite the strong environmental push among European investors.
In late 2023, the Board removed Looney after learning of his dishonesty regarding his relationships with fellow employees. Once again, a BP leader was caught lying. The shock of the management change was amplified by the extended underperformance of the stock. Activist shareholders began circling BP and began pressuring the company to sell to a larger international oil company.
The Board began an extensive search for a new CEO but eventually turned to its then-CFO, Murray Auchincloss, a longtime executive. In response to activist shareholder pressure, Auchincloss and the Board returned the company to its traditional oil and gas focus and de-emphasized its green energy business. It was during Auchincloss’s time as CEO that the Board saw Helge Lund, its chairman, leave and Manifold arrive.
The financial market assumed that BP was still a likely candidate for an acquisition or the sale of significant businesses to improve the company’s balance sheet and profitability. After lagging well behind its competitors, BP stock began to close the valuation gap, cheering up shareholders.
Manifold was instrumental in recruiting Meg O’Neil, the highly regarded CEO of Australian producer Woodside Energy, and an experienced ExxonMobil executive. She was hired last fall and assumed the CEO position on April 1st.
Heading into the 2026 BP shareholders’ meeting, Manifold opposed allowing shareholders to vote on two environmentalist-proposed resolutions that would require BP to disclose climate-related data. His opposition resulted in more than 18% of BP investors voting against Manifold’s re-election to the Board.
The media articles about the Manifold ousting were often reporting he-said, she-said comments about what had happened and why. Manifold says he was never made aware of whistleblower comments about his conduct. “I was removed without warning and without explanation,” Manifold said. “I dispute entirely the characterization of my conduct and I will not allow a false narrative to go unchallenged.” He is fighting the charges legally.
There were many comments from unnamed BP executives and others familiar with BP’s claims about his bullying and policy violations, most of which Manifold has refuted. As one person said, “They thought they were hiring a tough change agent, they didn’t think they were hiring a bully.” The change agent reference was to Manifold’s tenure as CEO of Irish cement maker CRH, one of the world’s largest building-materials suppliers, during which he led an overhaul of its portfolio. But it is possible that the skills that make one successful as a CEO, driving change and performance, are not transferable to being the chairman of the board of directors, where the role is governance, oversight, and guidance. Because Manifold had never chaired a board, this skills shortfall was being emphasized.
People familiar with the situation said there was tension among Manifold, the Board, and O’Neil, with the chairman overstepping his role and at times acting like an executive running the company’s day-to-day operations. However, all three parties have only been together for less than two months.
This may have been an example of some board members thinking Manifold was too aggressive. That is perfectly understandable, as board relationships and chemistries change whenever the board’s composition changes. Having served on five public company boards of directors, we are very familiar with the chemistry shifts that occur whenever board composition changes and even after senior management changes. A new chemistry needed to evolve, and the pressure to make significant changes at BP was an added ingredient in the chemistry mix.
In that regard, a recent article reports extreme tension between BP’s secretary, Ben Mathews, and Manifold. The company secretary reported directly to Manifold and was charged with supporting corporate governance and overseeing the annual meeting, which was seen as a disaster for Manifold, given the high number of negative shareholder votes.
The tension, discussed by knowledgeable people, related to costs. In Manifold’s most recent statement, he said BP had “lacked strategic cohesion and direction.” It was failing on “urgency of delivery,” he said. Manifold further said that he wanted the board and management to be relentlessly focused on shareholders’ rights and making BP better. He also felt that not everyone shared his priorities.
A person close to Manifold said that Mathews had been a “driver” of BP’s decision to remove Manifold. Was it all about Manifold’s pressure against excessive spending? Were the bullying and conduct complaints a convenient vehicle to motivate the board to remove Manifold? If so, it would support the comment by a former BP executive that “The problems at BP are rooted in the weakness of the board.”
Manifold had been BP’s chairman for less than a year. During that time, he was focused on hiring a new CEO. It is likely that, in the absence of a CEO, Manifold was aggressive in commenting on what BP needed: a strategic restructuring and improved operating and financial performance. He likely saw the need to change the company’s culture. Without the new CEO in place, he needed to become the face of the new BP. Therefore, we find it strange that the Board was so quick to oust Manifold for issues that could have been corrected with time.
During our tenure on corporate boards, two of our companies were forced to change management. It is not a pleasant task, but it is the chief responsibility of the board of directors, after setting strategy. If board chemistry is unsettled, rash personnel actions reflect the board’s weakness. Is this the time for Meg O’Neil to rise and become the leader of BP, letting the chair role become low-key and more administrative? It may be hard for the “new kid on the block” to push, but O’Neil is a savvy oil and gas executive who was trained by one of the best-managed energy companies, ExxonMobil, before honing her skills as CEO of Woodside Energy.
She will play a critical role in recruiting BP’s next chairman. That person will be responsible for managing the directors, and it may be time for a major overhaul to bring in more skilled professional directors to help management drive BP’s operational and financial performance. BP cannot afford to continue its decades-long management crisis. Failure to address the board issues will leave BP as a perpetual under-performer.